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THE GOOD OCCUPATION? LAW IN THE ALLIED 
OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 
YOSHIRO MIWA 
J. MARK RAMSEYER∗ 
They left Japan in shambles. By the time they surrendered in 1945, 
Japan’s military leaders had slashed industrial production to 1930 levels.1 
Not so with the American occupiers. By the time they left in 1952, they 
had rebuilt the economy and grown it by fifty percent.2 By 1960 the 
economy had tripled, and by 1970 tripled once more.3 
For Japan’s spectacular economic recovery, the American-run Allied 
Occupation had apparently set the stage. The Americans had occupied, and 
the economy had boomed. The Americans had ruled, and Japan had 
thrived. At least during the Occupation’s early years, the Americans had 
apparently planned and run a “Good Occupation.”  
Or so it is often said. In fact, the Americans did nothing of the sort. 
When they arrived in 1945, they brought few economic plans. Rather than 
invent a new plan, they simply helped incumbent bureaucrats keep the 
legal controls they had manipulated—disastrously—throughout the War. 
Coming from the New Deal, many Americans brought an instinctive 
aversion to competitive market policies. After rehabilitating the Marxist 
leaders and intellectuals, the Americans let them use the legal apparatus to 
ideological ends. With a Socialist Premier, Japanese voters let them try.  
By 1948, the voters had had enough. Under the legal controls, miners 
did not mine. Firms did not produce. Farmers sold, if they sold at all, only 
on the black market. With inflation out of control and production stuck at 
desultory levels, conservatives struck back. They installed the 
quintessentially capitalist Shigeru Yoshida as Prime Minister; Yoshida 
promptly shut down the planning apparatus, and Japanese voters ratified 
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ECONOMIC HISTORY] 2–3 (2d ed. 1987). 
 2. Id. 
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the change. Inflation stopped, the economy rebounded, and Washington 
politicians forced their control-inclined agents in Tokyo to acquiesce. 
After June 1950 (after it had already started to recover), the economy 
enjoyed a procurement bonus from the Korean War.4 
I. OCCUPATION HISTORIOGRAPHY 
A. The Debate 
In the half century since its close, General Douglas MacArthur’s 
occupation of Japan (called “SCAP,” for Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers) has begotten a thriving historiography. To historian and 
U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer, MacArthur was “one of 
the great names in Japanese history, surpassed by few in Japan’s long 
annals.”5 If MacArthur was the right leader, for Reischauer he had the 
right staff besides: “General MacArthur’s staff of experts in Tokyo and on 
the Military Government teams throughout Japan turned in a performance 
which was uniformly good and sometimes brilliant.”6  
Scholars since have been less kind. To historian John Dower, for 
example, the Occupation begot a “bourgeois-democratic ‘revolution’” that 
one could properly understand only through “the dialectic between 
domestic configurations and the structure of post-surrender Japan’s global 
involvement.”7 Within that global order, “the great legacy” of the 
Occupation was the Japanese “acquiescence to the American imperium.”8 
Within that global imperium, one could properly understand the 
Occupation only through the “problems of capitalism, imperialism, 
ideology and class.”9 And those problems one could properly understand 
only by considering “the role of . . . the petroleum cartels; key banks . . . ; 
investment firms . . . ; the Rockefeller interests; agricultural and textile 
lobbies; etc.”10  
 
 
 4. We omit from this article several important related issues: zaibatsu dissolution, 
deconcentration, the purges, the reparation plans, and land reform. On these issues, see Yoshiro Miwa 
& J. Mark Ramseyer, The Good Occupation (Harvard Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 514, 2005), 
available at http://www.papers.ssrn.com/abstract=729463. 
 5. EDWIN O. REISCHAUER, THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, 224 (rev. ed., 1961). 
 6. Id. at 228. 
 7. John W. Dower, Recent Japan in Historical Revisionism: Occupied Japan as History and 
Occupation History as Politics, 34 J. ASIAN STUD. 485, 486 (1975). 
 8. Id. at 487. 
 9. Id. at 490. 
 10. Id. at 491 n.3. 
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B. Occupation Planning 
Yet even to their critics, the Americans had at least planned the 
Occupation. “Planning for the occupation of Japan actually began in the 
immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor,” writes Dower.11 “Due in good part 
to the impressive activities of a small State Department group led by Hugh 
Borton and George Blakeslee,” he explains, “planning for postsurrender 
Japan at the lower levels of the bureaucracy was in fact well advanced 
when the war ended.”12  
And to the Occupation’s early years, continue many historians, 
Americans brought an “idealistic vision of ‘economic democracy.’”13 
Consistent both “with the lessons of successful wartime planning, and with 
the history of developing economies more generally[,] the government 
was assigned a major role in setting priorities and guiding 
reconstruction.”14 Effuses Dower, the Occupation’s success owed itself 
precisely to the planner’s zeal: “What made the occupation of Japan a 
success was two years or so of genuine reformist idealism before U.S. 
policy became consumed by the Cold War . . . .”15  
Rather than implement their plans directly, Occupation planners 
worked through the Japanese government. More specifically, they 
implemented their plans through (and entrusted even the details of plan 
design to) the Japanese bureaucrats who had run the economy during the 
War. Those planners, in turn, operated what they called a “priority 
production scheme” (keisha seisan seido (“PPS”)) that—ostensibly—
routed crucial economic resources (like coal) to critical sectors (like 
steel).16  
Although Liberal Party leader Shigeru Yoshida (Prime Minister from 
May 1946 through May 1947) fought economic planning, his Japan 
Socialist Party (“JSP”) successor did not. Upon taking power in the spring 
of 1947, Socialist Prime Minister Tetsu Katayama promptly implemented 
PPS with full force. “There can be no question that priority production 
 
 
 11. John W. Dower, Op-Ed, Lessons from Japan About War’s Aftermath, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 
2002, § 4, at 13; see also John W. Dower, Editorial, Bush’s Comparison of Iraq with Postwar Japan 
Ignores the Facts, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at B11. 
 12. JOHN W. DOWER, JAPAN IN WAR AND PEACE: SELECTED ESSAYS 165 (1993). 
 13. John W. Dower, Occupations and Empires: Why Iraq Is Not Japan, ASIA PAC. J.: JAPAN 
FOCUS, available at http://japanfocus.org (follow “All Articles” hyperlink; then search “Dower” in the 
author field). 
 14. Id. 
 15. John W. Dower, A Warning from History: Don’t Expect Democracy in Iraq, BOSTON REV., 
Feb./Mar. 2003. 
 16. DAVID FLATH, THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 82 (2000). 
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achieved results,”17 declares political scientist Chalmers Johnson. 
According to sociologist Bai Gao, “[i]mplementation of the priority 
production program was largely successful in promoting productivity in 
key industries.”18  
C. The Reverse Course 
Then, everything changed. Between 1947 and 1949, write most 
historians, the Occupation dramatically shifted course.19 In the U.S. mid-
term elections of 1946, the Republicans captured both the House and the 
Senate. Stridently, they pressured President Truman to restrain his New 
Deal economic planners in Tokyo. He did, and despite the Democratic 
resurgence in 1948 sent Detroit banker Joseph Dodge to Tokyo to put the 
Japanese economy in order.20  
To most scholars, the Japanese economy presented little disorder for 
Dodge to fix. The PPS had worked, after all, and at worst had created 
some inflation. Nevertheless, Dodge mandated draconian austerity. In the 
process, write most scholars, he did stop inflation.21 Unfortunately, he 
imposed a cure far worse than the disease: he “succeeded in reining in 
inflation,” claims Dower, “at costs that Japanese across the political 
spectrum found increasingly unpalatable.”22  
Through Dodge Washington bet the Japanese economy and lost, in 
other words, or would have lost but for the Korean War. Once the war 
began in mid-1950, Washington started to order massive amounts of 
supplies from Japanese firms. Declares historian Howard Schonberger: 
“Only the unexpected outbreak of the Korean War rescued the American 
position in Japan from the political and economic morass left in the wake 
of the Dodge Plan.”23  
 
 
 17. CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL 
POLICY, 1925–1975, at 185 (1982). 
 18. BAI GAO, ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY AND JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL POLICY: DEVELOPMENTALISM 
FROM 1931 TO 1965, at 169 (1997). 
 19. See, e.g., FLATH, supra note 16, at 83.  
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 83–84. Flath correctly notes that the inflation had slowed before Dodge arrived. Id. at 
84–85. 
 22. JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 541 (1999). 
 23. HOWARD B. SCHONBERGER, AFTERMATH OF WAR: AMERICANS AND THE REMAKING OF 
JAPAN, 1945–1952, at 225 (1989). 
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II. DID MACARTHUR PLAN THE OCCUPATION? 
This account misleads at several levels. Most basically, Washington 
brought no economic plans. It claimed not even to care whether the 
Japanese economy recovered. According to the November 1945 Basic 
Directive for Post-Surrender, Washington wanted MacArthur instead “to 
foster conditions which will give the greatest possible assurance that Japan 
will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world and 
will permit her eventual admission as a responsible and peaceful member 
of the family of nations.”24 MacArthur’s ultimate objective, in short, was 
not to rehabilitate. It was to prevent: to ensure that Japan would not again 
threaten the rest of the world. 
Still, readers might properly ask whether economic recovery would not 
help Japan rejoin the “family of nations”? Might Truman’s staff have 
wanted MacArthur to facilitate that recovery in order to reintegrate Japan? 
If they did want it, they did not mention it in the details that followed. 
Only in the Basic Directive’s second level of detail did Truman’s staff 
even discuss the Japanese economy. There, they listed the economic goals 
they expected MacArthur to pursue.25 Yet “rebuilding” was not among 
them. Instead, they ordered him “[t]o destroy the economic ability of 
Japan to create or support any armaments dangerous to international 
peace,” and “[t]o encourage the development within Japan of economic 
ways and institutions of a type that will contribute to the growth of 
peaceful and democratic forces in Japan.”26 
Again, readers sympathetic to the early Occupation might ask whether 
the goals are not ambiguous. The first goal is brutal by any measure, as 
any even moderately prosperous country will have the “economic ability” 
to “create or support” a munitions industry. But the second? Might 
Truman’s staff have thought economic recovery would “contribute to the 
growth of peaceful and democratic forces”?  
Here, too, the details eliminate the ambiguity. In further instructions, 
Truman’s staff ordered MacArthur to implement “the reduction or 
elimination of certain branches of Japanese production, such as iron, steel, 
chemicals, non-ferrous metals, aluminum, magnesium, synthetic rubber, 
synthetic oil, machine tools, radio and electrical equipment, automotive 
 
 
 24. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF BASIC DIRECTIVE FOR POST-SURRENDER MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN 
JAPAN PROPER, Directive 1380/15, Nov. 3, 1945, reprinted in POLITICAL REORIENTATION OF JAPAN: 
SEPTEMBER 1945 TO SEPTEMBER 1948, GOVERNMENT SECTION, SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE 
ALLIED POWERS 429 (1950) [hereinafter JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF]. 
 25. Id. at 433–36. 
 26. Id. at 433. 
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vehicles, merchant ships, heavy machines, and important parts thereof.”27 
Further, they instructed him to “insure that all laboratories, research 
institutes, and similar technological organizations are closed immediately 
except those you deem necessary to the purposes of the occupation.”28  
MacArthur did not care about rebuilding the economy. He did not care, 
because Truman had ordered him not to care: “You will not assume any 
responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Japan or the strengthening 
of the Japanese economy.”29 Rebuilding the Japanese economy was simply 
not his job. 
III. DID THE PLANNING WORK? 
A. The Personnel 
To claim not to care whether people have enough to eat is one thing. 
To govern them successfully while they starve is another, and few 
governments can rule while feigning total indifference. To jump-start the 
Japanese economy, SCAP and the Japanese government turned to legal 
controls. The former included a large cohort of committed New Dealers, 
while the latter included the bureaucrats who had tried to control the 
wartime economy.  
As an organization, SCAP took no specific position on economic 
planning. Like most large bureaucracies, on most issues it had many 
positions. Maneuvering as he was for the Republican presidential 
nomination, MacArthur himself did not push planning. Neither, however, 
did he understand economics well enough or monitor his staff closely 
enough to oppose it consistently. Even Washington did not take a 
consistent line. Although Truman himself did not try to plan or control the 
U.S. economy, in November 1945 the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the 
Japanese government that it could “establish and administer any controls 
over economic activities that are appropriate or necessary.”30  
The bureaucrats in the Japanese government were men of legal 
controls. During the war, they had implemented many of their controls 
through industry-specific “control associations.”31 Given the military role 
 
 
 27. Id. at 434. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 433. 
 30. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 24, at 435. 
 31. See THEODORE COHEN, REMAKING JAPAN: THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AS NEW DEAL 328 
(Herbert Passin ed., 1987). The ineffectiveness of the wartime controls is discussed at length in 
YOSHIRO MIWA, KEIKAKUTEKI SENSOJUNBI, GUNJU DOIN, KEIZAI TOSEI: ZOKU “SEIFU NO NORYOKU” 
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of the associations, in mid-1946 SCAP ordered them disbanded.32 Many, 
however, promptly regrouped. The association in the coal industry did not 
even wait for SCAP to dissolve it. Instead, anticipating the SCAP decree, 
it dissolved in May 1946 on its own.33 The next day, it duly re-emerged as 
the Coal Mining Association.34 
Crucial to the implementation of the legal controls lay the informal 
alliance between SCAP’s Economic and Scientific Section (“ESS”) and 
the Japanese government’s Economic Stabilization Board, keizai antei 
honbu (“ESB”).35 Within SCAP, ESS contained some of its more 
determined New Deal civilians.36 Those New Dealers had originally 
pushed the Japanese government to form the ESB.37 The Cabinet complied 
in March 1946, SCAP approved the new organization in May, and the 
ESB began operations in August.38  
Although the government initially created the ESB under a one-year 
term, in May 1947 it extended that term and strengthened it.39 Again, it did 
so under pressure from the ESS. Formally, the pressure came as a letter 
from MacArthur to Yoshida.40 Yoshida had long opposed legal controls 
over the economy, but the letter declared it “the responsibility of the 
Japanese Government to maintain a firm control over wages and prices 
and to initiate and maintain a strict rationing program for essential 
commodities.”41 Toward that end, it ordered the government “through the 
Economic Stabilization Board which was created for this purpose, [to] 
take early and vigorous steps to develop and implement the integrated 
series of economic and financial controls which the current situation 
demands.”42  
 
 
[WARTIME PLANNING, MOBILIZATION, AND ECONOMIC CONTROL IN JAPAN: FURTHER STUDIES IN 
“THE COMPETENCE OF THE STATE”] (2008). The notion that the Japanese government planned the later 
postwar recovery is a myth, as we discuss in YOSHIRO MIWA & J. MARK RAMSEYER, THE FABLE OF 
THE KEIRETSU: URBAN LEGENDS OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY (2006). 
 32. Id. at 328–29. 
 33. Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Keizai kisei no yukosei: “Keisha seisan” seisaku no 
shinwa [The Effectiveness of Economic Controls: The Myth of the “Keisha Seisan” Policy] (pts. 1 & 
2), 70(2) KEIZAIGAKU RONSHU 2, 70(3) KEIZAIGAKU RONSHU 60, 66 (2004). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 63. 
 36. Id. at 65. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 63. 
 39. Chokurei [Imperial Order] No. 193 of 1947. 
 40. Letter from Douglas MacArthur to Yoshida Shigeru (Mar. 22, 1947), in SUPREME 
COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, SUMMATION NO. OE NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES, No. 18 
(1947). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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That a Republican presidential hopeful would sign such a letter 
illustrates the agency slack at SCAP. In fact, MacArthur had not written 
the letter at all; Marxist economist Shigeto Tsuru had. In time, Tsuru 
would make a name for himself as a scholar and eventually university 
president. During the Occupation, he allied himself with the New Dealers 
in SCAP. As Tsuru later recalled, one day ESS Chief William F. Marquat 
called in sick. Marquat opposed strong controls but his stand-in, statistics 
Section Chief Ross, did not. With Marquat out, Ross and Tsuru discussed 
what to do. Ross suggested that Tsuru simply draft whatever letter he 
wanted. Tsuru did, Ross took it to MacArthur for his signature, and 
MacArthur sent it to Yoshida.43  
The New Dealers at SCAP wanted the ESB because it helped them 
circumvent their more conservative superiors. In the ESB, the ESS had a 
counterpart with which it could deal directly. In effect, by working 
together the control-oriented bureaucrats at the ESS and ESB could cut out 
the more market-oriented men for whom they nominally worked. Indeed, 
to facilitate this collusion, SCAP New Dealers created a post in the 
renewed ESB expressly for Tsuru. Over the Board as a whole they placed 
a coordinating committee, and for Tsuru they created the position of 
Deputy Chair.44  
B. The Economic Planning 
1. The Socialist Government 
The economic controls did not work. By most accounts, the PPS ran 
from the last quarter of fiscal year 1946 (January–March 1947) through 
late in calendar year 1948.45 The PPS was not implemented in full force, 
though, until Katayama formed a Socialist coalition cabinet in the spring 
of 1947. Katayama himself stayed in power through the winter of 1948. 
 
 
 43. Takehisa Hayashi, Sogo kaidai “Keizai antei honbu ni tsuite” [General Review: “Regarding 
the Economic Stabilization Board”], in SOGO KENKYU KAIHATSU KIKO SENGO KEIZAI SEISAKU 
KENKYU KAI, KEIZAI ANTEI HONBU: SENGO KEIZAI SEISAKU SHI SHIRYO [THE ECONOMIC 
STABILIZATION BOARD: MATERIALS ON POST-WAR ECONOMIC POLICY HISTORY] 20 (1994).  
 44. Id. at 22. 
 45. The statutory and regulatory provisions behind the program are complex, and we detail them 
in Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note 33, especially at 22. On December 27, 1946, the Cabinet passed a 
plan for production for the next quarter and decided to organize a special fund for allocating capital 
preferentially to crucial industries. As this was not formally known as PPS, some ambiguity in the 
exact timing of the program is unavoidable. See 17 TSUSHO SANGYO SHO, SHOKO SEISAKU SHI: TEKKO 
GYO [HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY: THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY] 456 
(1970). 
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He lost control in February, and power passed in March to the Democratic 
Party (formerly Progressive Party) head, Hitoshi Ashida. In turn, Ashida 
lost control to Yoshida that October. Once in office, Yoshida promptly 
began to dismantle Katayama’s controls. He accelerated the de-control 
after winning the January 1949 election, and by September 1949 had 
eliminated the PPS entirely.  
Long before its electoral victory, the JSP had planned to nationalize 
key industries. It had made “the realization of a socialist planned 
economy” key to its fall 1945 platform.46 Toward that end, it had declared 
it would work to “nationalize the steel industry, the coal industry, the 
artificial fertilizer industry, the electrical power industry, and other basic 
industries.”47 Indeed, it continued, it would “nationalize the banking, trust, 
and insurance industries” as well.48 Already in 1946 it had introduced 
legislation to nationalize the coal industry. Now the time had come to 
proceed apace. At the heart of its basic program lay economic controls, 
and at the heart of those controls lay PPS.  
2. PPS 
For both the planners themselves and the later historians, coal was key 
to a PPS. As the energy source for perhaps half of industrial production, 
coal was central to the Japanese recovery. When the War ended, coal 
production shut down as well. In the early months of 1945, Japanese 
mines still produced at mid-1930s levels.49 By December they extracted 
only a quarter of the 1935–1937 monthly average, and by June of 1946 
still extracted less than half.50 To recover, Japan badly needed more coal.  
a. Prices and Subsidies 
To increase that coal production, the PPS could have let prices rise, of 
course. Had it merely left coal alone, demand would have raised prices. 
Those higher market prices would then have induced mines to dig what 
users could cost-effectively use. That tactic, however, the government 
refused to use. Instead, it tried to increase production while keeping prices 
low.  
 
 
 46. NIHON SHAKAITO, SHIRYO NIHON SHAKAITO YONJUNENSHI [MATERIALS: A FORTY-YEAR 
HISTORY OF THE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY] 7, 71, 84 (1986). 
 47. Id. at 74, 84. 
 48. Id. at 74. 
 49. Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note 33, at 24–29. 
 50. Id. at 67, 99. 
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In effect, the government wanted firms to mine coal for prices below 
what it cost to mine it. On Figure 1, we plot authorized PPS prices against 
production costs. Consistently, prices fell short of costs. To be sure, we 
take the production costs from the mining industry association, which had 
every incentive to exaggerate. Even if accurate, moreover, the figures give 
average rather than marginal costs. Notwithstanding these limitations, 
Figure 1 suggests a basic point: under the authorized price regime, firms 
had little incentive to extract their coal. 
FIGURE 1: PRODUCTION COSTS AND OFFICIAL SALES PRICE OF COAL, 
1945–194951 
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Although the government had promised to compensate firms for the 
gap between the authorized price and production costs, it did not do so. 
Rather than compensate full losses it paid only part, and rather than pay 
promptly it delayed. Given the hyper-inflation, that delay cut the actual 
scope of the compensation further still. From April through July 5, 1947, 
 
 
 51. TOMOYOSHI NEZU, SEKITAN KOKKA TOSEI SHI [A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CONTROLS 
OVER COAL] 878, tab. 330 (1958). 
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mining firms claimed losses of 3.94 billion yen.52 Of this amount, the 
government eventually compensated 82.5% (3.25 billion yen).53 Of that 
82.5%, it did not pay 69% (2.23 billion yen) until late March 1948.54  
In the interim, the government loaned firms their expected 
compensation payments (fukkin yushi),55 but these loans would not have 
induced the firms to mine more. The question is obviously over-
determined. Firms will not dig coal if production costs exceed the sales 
price and they will not dig even if the buyer loans the sales price in 
advance. Even if the sales price had been right, the firms would have used 
the loans to dig coal only if that earned them the highest returns. Whether 
subsidized or not, loans are fungible. If non-mining projects pay higher 
returns than mining, firms will shift the loans toward those other projects.  
b. Shortages and Black Markets 
The PPS did not so much cause rationing as shortages. To buy PPS-
controlled goods on the official market, a would-be buyer needed 
government coupons. Through those coupons, he obtained the right to buy 
a specified amount at the specified price. Yet if the coupon gave him the 
right to buy, it did not give him the ability to buy, for it did not mean he 
could find anyone willing to sell.  
In most industries, the government set the official price substantially 
below the market-clearing price. Set the legal price below that market 
price, and shortages necessarily ensue. At the legal PPS price, in many 
sectors buyers simply could not locate many suppliers willing to sell. A 
firm that wanted steel could expect a half-year delay. During the fourth 
quarter of fiscal year 1947 (January–March 1948), would-be buyers held 
unfilled orders for 308,000 tons. Of those orders, suppliers would supply 
only 120,000 tons.56  
Rather than sell at legal (low) prices, producers sold at market (high) 
prices illegally. As inspectors fanned out across the country, they reported 
sixty thousand economic crimes per month.57 For this massive policing 
effort, the Socialists counted on the U.S. military. Reports Occupation 
 
 
 52. Id. at 890. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
 55. NEZU, supra note 51, at 862, 890 & tab. 340. 
 56. MINORU SHIBA, KEIZAI TOSEI NO JITTAI KARA MITA KEIZAIHAN CHOSA NO YOTEI [THE 
SECRET OF THE INVESTIGATION OF ECONOMIC CRIMES, SEEN FROM THE REALITY OF ECONOMIC 
CONTROLS] 171 (1948). 
 57. COHEN, supra note 31, at 313. 
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official Theodore Cohen, “Eighth Army Military Government teams in the 
field were deployed all over the country to check the price of fresh fish 
. . . .”58 The scope of the putative policing, of course, mostly just reflects 
the enormity of the problem. Under the JSP’s ESS controls, consumers 
and firms that needed controlled goods had little choice: buy them 
illegally. During 1947, cement producers bought ten to twenty percent of 
their coal on the black market. Paper pulp firms obtained eleven percent 
through the black market. Bicycle makers bought forty-five percent of 
their coke on the black market, and cotton weaving factories obtained half 
of their coke there.59  
c. Production 
If the pretext behind the PPS was to increase production, it was a goal 
the program did not meet. Under PPS, firms produced only 73% of the pig 
iron planned in fiscal year 1947. They produced 86% of the steel planned, 
72% of the ammonium sulfate, 92% of the soda ash, 67% of the cement, 
and 69% of the cotton thread.60 The government set a monthly target of 2.5 
million metric tons of coal against the actual amounts produced. Yet firms 
mined only slightly more than two million tons a month through most of 
the year. Not until December did they finally break 2.5 million tons.61  
Only after the government abandoned the JSP’s policies did production 
boom. After Katayama’s cabinet collapsed in February 1948, Ashida 
continued some but not all of Katayama’s controls (the JSP remained in 
his coalition, but many of the strongest advocates of control left with 
Katayama). Under the Ashida cabinet, production still remained stuck at 
2.5 to 2.9 million monthly tons.62  
 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Kokumin keizai kenkyu kyokai, Dai 2 kai shuyo kigyo seisan jittai chosa hokoku sho 
[Second Report of the Investigation into the Production of Major Firms] (1948). In fact, the black 
market had also thrived during the war, as discussed in detail in Yoshiro Miwa, “Busshi doin 
keikaku,” “seisanryoku kakuju keikaku (seisaku),” keizai tousei (2) [“Materials-Mobilization Plans,” 
“Production-Capacity-Expansion Plans (Policies),” and Economic Controls in Wartime Japan (2)], 
73 KEIZAIGAKU RONSHU, 48 (2008). 
 60. 3 TSUSHO SANGYO SHO, TSUSHO SANGYO SEISAKU SHI, DAI IKKI [HISTORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY POLICY, FIRST PERIOD] 85 (1992) (Japan). 
 61. 3 TOYO KEIZAI SHIMPO SHA, SHOWA SANGYO SHI: TOKEI HEN [SHOWA INDUSTRIAL 
HISTORY: STATISTICS] 247–48 (1950). Although production did continue to climb thereafter, the 
increases primarily reflected the increase in mining personnel. In November 1946 monthly production 
per worker stood at 5.8 metric tons. It remained below that range until October 1947, and even in 
December 1947 remained at 5.9 tons. Id. at 251.  
 62. Id. at 247–48. 
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Urging the government to abandon these controls,63 Yoshida assembled 
a strongly non-interventionist cabinet in October. Under his 
administration, coal production proceeded apace. Yoshida pulled the 
controls from the lowest grade coal in 1948, and the output immediately 
hit three million tons. In March 1949 it broke 3.5 million tons.64 By July of 
1950, Yoshida had dropped all controls over the coal industry, and 
production for the year hit thirty-eight million tons.65 By 1955 it soared to 
forty-two million tons.66 
IV. DID DODGE STOP INFLATION? DID HE WRECK THE ECONOMY? 
A. Inflation 
Although historians routinely claim that Detroit banker Joseph Dodge 
(a) stopped inflation, but (b) stopped it by plunging Japan into a 
depression averted only by the Korean War, basic chronology suggests 
otherwise. Consider the claim that he halted inflation. On Figure 2, we plot 
monthly black-market price changes (by percentage) from October 1946 to 
January 1951. The message: by July 1948, monthly inflation had dropped 
close to zero. Although Dodge did not announce the “Dodge Line” until 
March 7, 1949, inflation stopped almost immediately after Katayama’s 
JSP-coalition cabinet collapsed in early 1948.67  
The Japanese government stopped the inflation by lifting the legal 
controls over the economy. After Katayama’s cabinet collapsed in 
February, Ashida began removing controls. Yoshida replaced Ashida in 
October, accelerated the de-control, and swept the January 1949 elections. 
With a strong popular mandate and a majority of Diet seats, Yoshida had 
the power within Japan to abandon the controls. What he lacked until the 
Dodge Line was the power to stop the pressure for controls from the ESS. 
Through Dodge, he obtained that power to stare down the ESS.  
 
 
 63. NEZU, supra note 51, at 788. 
 64. TOYO KEIZAI, supra note 61, at 247–48. 
 65. ANDO, supra note 1, at 13.  
 66. Id. 
 67. A point rightly noted by FLATH, supra note 16, at 84–85, and NAKAMURA TAKAFUSA, 
SHOWA KEIZAI SHI, translated in LECTURES ON MODERN JAPANESE ECONOMIC HISTORY 1926–1994, 
at 162–63 (1986). 
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FIGURE 2: BLACK-MARKET PRICE INDEX: PERCENTAGE CHANGE FROM 
PREVIOUS MONTH68 
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Note: Prices are for Tokyo. 
B. The Korean War 
If Dodge did not end the inflation, then neither did the Korean War 
save the economy from disaster, for by mid-1950 there was no disaster 
from which to save it. Yoshida had dismantled the controls, and Dodge 
(by holding the ESS at bay) had given him the latitude to do so. Where 
Katayama’s Socialists and the bureaucrats at the ESS and the ESB had 
crippled the economy, Yoshida and Dodge had replaced their controls with 
straightforward, non-interventionist fiscal and economic policies. 
Together, they placed the economy on the stable legal infrastructure 
entrepreneurs needed to engineer a recovery. Together, they began that 
recovery before the war even started. 
Again, simple chronology tells the story. On Figure 3, we plot monthly 
mining and manufacturing output from 1948 through 1951. Dodge 
announced his policies in March (the first vertical line) of 1949. For 
 
 
 68. 19 OKURASHO ZAISEISHISHITSU, SHOWA ZAISEI SHI—SHUSEN KARA KOWA MADE [JAPANESE 
FINANCE HISTORY: FROM THE END OF THE WAR TO THE PEACE TREATY] 60–61, 64–65 (1978). 
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expositional simplicity we index April 1949 production at 100. Note that 
the Korean War began in June 1950 (the second vertical line).  
FIGURE 3: INDEXED PRODUCTION: MINING AND MANUFACTURING 
(INDEXED AT 100 FOR APRIL 1949)69 
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The Figure suggests two points relevant here. First, although 
production stagnated for several months after Dodge left in May 1949, it 
did not decline. Instead, it plateaued. Second, by early 1950 production 
again began to grow. By June 1950, it stood twenty percent above its level 
a year before. Although the Korean War then conferred a munitions boom, 
the boom merely continued (at roughly the same pace) the growth that had 
already begun. 
 
 
 69. OKURA SHO ZAISEI SHI SHITSU, SHOWA ZAISEI SHI—SHUSEN KARA KOWA MADE, DAI 19 KAN 
[JAPANESE FINANCE HISTORY—FROM THE END OF THE WAR TO THE PEACE TREATY, vol. 19] (1978). 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
In the early postwar chaos, command-and-control bureaucrats took 
control of the Japanese government. To help them implement their 
policies, New Deal bureaucrats in SCAP manipulated their own 
organization as necessary. Once the Socialists took control in 1947, the 
government turned to wide-ranging legal controls over prices, wages, and 
distribution.  
Disaster ensued. The regulation stymied production, caused shortages, 
and generated black markets. Controls had not worked during the war (and 
would not later work in the 1960s and 70s).70 As the economy slid in the 
1940s, Japanese voters threw out the Socialists and elected a center-right 
government. These politicians then promptly shut down the controls. 
Belatedly realizing what their officers in Tokyo had been doing, 
Washington intervened to let Japanese voters create the capitalist 
framework they wanted. The economy rebounded, and the recovery 
followed. 
 
 
 70. On the wartime controls, see MIWA, supra note 31; on the myth of government controls in 
the 1960s and 1970s, see MIWA & RAMSEYER, supra note 31. 
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